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BREADTH OF THE ADA PREEMPTION PROVISION-
MORALES AND WOLENS REAFFIRMED AND THE
EXTENSION TO THE COMMON LAW
HANNAH MASON*
TN NORTHWEST, INC. V. GINSBERG, the Supreme Court held
that (1) the ADA preemption provision does apply to the
common law; (2) the respondent's breach of implied covenant,
the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, related to
"rates, routes, or services"; and (3) the implied covenant claim
was a state-imposed obligation and therefore preempted under
the ADA preemption provision.' The Court correctly applied
the previous precedent set forth under Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens. While this case
did not change the legal analysis and application of previous
precedent, it did reaffirm the breadth of the ADA preemption
provision through the extension of the provision to the com-
mon law and solidify the authority of the preemption provision
through the newfound united front of the Court's unanimous
decision.
The respondent, a member of Northwest's WorldPerks Pro-
gram, "[a] lleging that Northwest had ended his membership as
a cost-cutting measure tied to Northwest's merger with Delta Air
Lines," filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and all
other members situated similarly in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California.2 Under the WorldPerks pro-
gram members can earn "miles" by flying with Northwest and its
"partner" airlines and then redeem these "miles" for tickets and
services upgrades.3 The respondent became a member of North-
* Hannah Mason is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2016, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. She received a B.S. in Human Development and Family Sciences
from the University of Texas at Austin in 2013.
1 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430-35 (2014).
2 Id. at 1427.
3 Id. at 1426.
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west's WorldPerks program in 1999 and achieved "Platinum
Elite" status in 2005.'
In 2008, Northwest terminated the respondent's membership,
claiming he had abused the WorldPerks program. The airline
relied on a provision of the WorldPerks agreement that stated,
"[a] buse of the... program (including... improper conduct as
determined by [Northwest] in its sole judgment[ ) ] . . .may
result in cancellation of the member's account. ' 6 The respon-
dent was informed by phone and letter that his "Platinum Elite"
status was being revoked.7 The letter included the following ways
that the respondent had abused the program: (1) contacting
the office twenty-four times since December 3, 2007, regarding
travel problems (nine incidents of late luggage); (2) continually
asking for compensation over and above the program guide-
lines; and (3) awards of $1,925.00 in travel credit vouchers,
78,500 WorldPerks bonus miles, a voucher extension for respon-
dent's son, and $491.00 in cash reimbursements.8 After asking
for a clarification of his status, the respondent filed the class
action suit.'
The respondent's complaint asserted four separate claims: (1)
Northwest breached its contract by revoking his status "without
valid cause"; (2) Northwest violated the duty of good faith and
fair dealing "because it terminated his membership in a way that
contravened his reasonable expectations with respect to the
manner in which Northwest would exercise its discretion"; (3)
negligent misrepresentation; and (4) intentional misrepresenta-
tion.10 The district court held that the claims two through four,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and negli-
gent and intentional misrepresentation, were all preempted by
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)." The court stated
that these three claims "relate [d] to" Northwest's rates and ser-
vices and therefore fell under the ADA's preemption clause.' 2
The breach of contract claim was dismissed under Rule
12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
7 Id. at 1426-27.
s Id. at 1427.
9 Id.
10 Id.
1i Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012)).
12 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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respondent "had failed to identify any material breach because
the frequent flyer agreement gave Northwest sole discretion to
determine whether a participant had abused the program."1
The respondent appealed the dismissal of claim two, the
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim, only.14
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
breach of implied covenant claim was "too tenuously connected
to airline regulation to trigger preemption under the ADA."15
The court went on to state that this type of claim "does not inter-
fere with the [Act's] deregulatory mandate" and does not "force
the Airlines to adopt or change their prices, routes or services-
the prerequisite for.., preemption."16 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
also stated that the covenant did not fall within the ADA's pre-
emption provision because the covenant did not have a "direct
effect on either 'prices' or 'services."' 1
The Supreme Court set out three issues, two sub-issues and
one main issue: (1) whether the ADA preemption provision ap-
plies to common law rules; (2) whether the breach of implied
covenant claim relates to "rates, routes, or services"; and (3)
whether the implied covenant claim is a state-imposed obliga-
tion or a voluntary agreement between the parties.1 8 Relying
chiefly on the precedent set forth by the two prior Supreme
Court cases that address the ADA preemption provision, Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
the Court held that the ADA preemption provision does apply
to the common law; the respondent's breach of implied cove-
nant claim relates to airlines' "rates," which is a part of the lan-
guage requirement set forth under the ADA preemption
provision; and that based on Minnesota law, the controlling law
in this case, the covenant is a state obligation and therefore pre-
empted by the ADA. 9
The first sub-issue the Court addressed was the application of
the ADA preemption provision to the common law.20 The Court
held that the common law fell within the language of the pre-
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
16 Id. at 880.
17 Id. at 880-81.
18 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429-31.
19 Id. at 1429-33.
20 Id. at 1429.
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emption provision by looking at (1) the actual wording of the
statute in comparison with the original wording of the statute,
previous precedent, and similar government statutes; (2) the re-
lationship to the savings clause; and (3) the central purpose of
the ADA preemption provision as well as the motivation of Con-
gress to adopt the ADA as a whole. 21 Looking first to the lan-
guage of the statute, the current version of the preemption
provision applies to state "law[s], regulation s], or other provi-
sion[s] having the force and effect of law."' 22 The Court relied
on previous precedent that states it is routine to call common
law rules "provisions, ' 23 and that the above mentioned phrase is
most naturally read "to refe [r] to binding standards of conduct
that operate irrespective of any private agreement. '24 The Court
went on to compare the original wording of the statute to the
identical language of the preemption provision and savings
clause of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which has been held to
include the common law, and stated that even though the origi-
nal language is no longer included, it was deleted during a
recodification that was not meant to cause a substantive
change.25 Therefore, the language of the ADA should be treated
in a similar fashion as the Federal Railroad Safety Act, thus in-
cluding the common law.26 Finally, the Court held that if the
common law was allowed to be exempted from the preemption
provision, the purpose of the ADA regulation, to allow aspects of
air travel to be set by market forces, would be frustratedY.2 All in
all, the Court found no trouble in applying the preemption pro-
vision language to the common law implied covenant claim.2
The second sub-issue that the Court addressed was the rela-
tion of the respondent's breach of implied covenant claim to
the "rates, routes, or services" language set forth in the preemp-
tion provision.2 9 The claim relates to the provision if it has a
"connection with or reference to airline" prices, routes, or ser-
21 Id. at 1429-30.
22 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012).
23 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 n.3 (1994);
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 700 (1964).
24 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 n.5 (1995) (alteration in
original).
25 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429.
26 Id.




vices.30 The Court looked to Wolens for the standard to evaluate
the relation because the case included a similar frequent flyer
mile contract. 31 "[T] he Northwest program is connected to the
airline's 'rates' because the program awards mileage credits that
can be redeemed for tickets and upgrades. 32 The use of miles
in this manner affects the rates that customers pay because the
price of a particular ticket is either "eliminated or reduced."33
The Court found that this program, as had its predecessor in
Wolens, related to airline rates and therefore fell under the lan-
guage of the preemption provision. 4
Lastly, the Court turned to the main issue of the case, whether
the implied covenant claim was based on a state-imposed obliga-
tion or voluntarily entered into by the parties. 5 The Court once
again looked to precedent established by Wolens, which held
that when state law does not allow parties to "free themselves"
from the covenant, the claim is preempted under the ADA be-
cause the covenant is a state obligation.3 6 The controlling Min-
nesota law established that the covenant was in fact a state-
imposed obligation because parties within the jurisdiction may
not contract out of the covenant and Minnesota law holds that
the implied covenant applies to "every contract. '37 The Court
concluded by reversing the Ninth Circuit opinion, holding that
the implied covenant claim, the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, was preempted under the ADA preemption provision.38
The Supreme Court correctly interpreted the precedent set
forth in the two previous preemption holdings, Morales and
Wolens. In both of these cases, the Court focused on the wording
of the statute and the original purpose of the ADA. 39 The origi-
nal purpose and Congress's motivation for enacting the ADA
was "to encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation sys-
tem which relies on competitive market forces to determine the
30 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).






36 Id. at 1431-32; see also Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-33.
37 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1432.
38 Id. at 1433-34.
39 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226-35; Morales, 504 U.S. at 380-91.
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quality, variety, and price of air services. ' 4' This motivation was
key to the expansion to the common law. 41 The first two sub-
issues, the application to the common law and the relation to
"rates, routes, or services," followed the same legal analysis set
forth under Morales and Wolens.4 2 In applying the preemption
provision to the common law, the Court relied on a language
determinations made in Wolens in addition to the purpose of the
ADA, stating that the preemption provision is "most naturally
read to 'refe [r] to binding standards of conduct that operate
irrespective of any private agreement.' ,,4' The Court went on to
state that there was no reason to hold that the "standards must
be based on statute or regulation as opposed to the common
law."' 44 Issue two relied heavily on the broad language set forth
under Morales and affirmed by Wolens, once again holding that
the key phrase "related to" expresses a "broad pre-emptive
purpose. 4
5
The third issue especially related to Wolens and was properly
resolved under the precedent because the facts of the cases were
exceptionally similar; both cases dealt with a frequent flyer con-
tract dispute that was related to a state law obligation.46 The
Court based its decision on the main issue of the case, whether
the implied covenant claim was based on state-imposed obliga-
tion or voluntarily entered into by the parties, upon the two op-
tions set forth under Wolens.47 The Court followed the
appropriate application determining that the state law governed
the application of the ADA preemption clause; therefore, the
implied covenant claim was preempted as a state-imposed obli-
gation.48 The Court continued to follow the "middle course"
adopted by the holding in Wolens. 49 The Court focused on this
somewhat artificial line set forth under previous precedent that
4 H.R. REP. No. 95-1779, at 53 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3773 (capitilization omitted).
41 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
42 See id. at 1429-31; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226-35; Morales, 504 U.S. at 383-91.
43 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1428, 1430-31 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29; Morales, 504 U.S. at
383).
46 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1426-27; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 224-26.
47 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431-33; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
48 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1432; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-33.
49 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1433; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234 (considered the "middle
course" because Justice Stevens interpreted Morales to "demand only minimal
preemption, but Justice O'Connor read the same case to mandate total preemp-
tion," so the Court in Wolens adopted a holding between the two).
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appeases both the airlines and the states while actually making a
significant expansion in the breadth of the ADA preemption
provision.5 °
The true importance of this case does not rest in the legal
analysis of the ADA preemption precedent but in the extension
of the preemption provision to the common law and the unani-
mous decision made by the Court. While the Supreme Court
had "little difficulty" applying the preemption provision to the
common law, it is significant to note that this was the first time
that the preemption provision was officially held to include the
common law.51 This decision was played down by the Court
through labeling the common law issue as a sub-issue and in-
stead focusing on the "central issue," whether the implied cove-
nant claim was based on state-imposed obligation or voluntarily
entered into by the parties. However, it is significant to note that
the Ninth Circuit focused heavily on the application to the com-
mon law when making its decision. 52 Additionally, unlike the de-
cisions in Morales and Wolens, the Supreme Court was
unanimous in its holding of this caseY.5 The unanimity of this
holding is significant because the previous two cases were not
only split decisions, but they also included long scathing dissents
by more than one Justice as well as a concurrence in Wolens.5 4 In
conclusion, this case not only reaffirmed the breadth of the pre-
emption provision unanimously but also extended it to the com-
mon law, which is a significant triumph for the airlines that rely
on the protection of the ADA preemption provision.
The Court made three other statements that are also worth
noting. First, the respondent in this case alleged that Wolens was
not controlling because frequent flyer programs have "funda-
mentally changed" since the time of that decision, and the
Court went on to acknowledge that most miles are now received
through non-airline services and redeemed for services and
50 See generally Ann Morales Olazdbal et al., Frequent Flyer Programs: Empirically
Assessing Consumers' Reasonable Expectations, 51 Am. Bus. L.J. 175, 199 (2014) (dis-
cussing the "middle path" established by the ruling in Wolens).
51 See Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429; see also Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis:Justices
Hold "Good Faith and Fair Dealing" Claim About Frequent-Flyer Program Preempted,
SCOTUSBLoG (Apr. 3, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/ar-
gument-analysis-justices-hold-good-faith-and-fair-dealing-claim-about-frequent-
flyer-program-preempted/.
52 Ginsberg v. Northwest, Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2012).
53 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1426; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 221; Morales, 504 U.S. at 375.
54 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 235-51; Morales, 504 U.S. at 419-28.
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products other than airline tickets, flights, and services." The
Court stated that while this was not the case in Ginsberg (so the
Court did not address the issue), this change has the potential
to impact future cases.56 Second, and more noteworthy, the
Court emphasized the general authority given to the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) to prohibit and punish unfair
practices in air transportation and in the sale of air transporta-
tion, stating that the holding did "not leave participants in fre-
quent flyer programs without protection. 5 7 This was in sharp
contrast to the statement made in Wolens that "DOT has neither
the authority nor the apparatus required to superintend a con-
tract dispute resolution regime.51 8 This difference highlights the
change in DOT authority in the past twenty years since the
Wolens holding in 1995. Lastly, the Court indicated that the re-
spondent should have appealed his breach of contract claim be-
cause he could have presented the argument that his
membership was ended for an "ulterior reason"; the Court im-
plied that this claim would not have been preempted and he
could have possibly prevailed. °
By focusing on and correctly applying the previous Supreme
Court precedent in the area of ADA preemption, the Court at-
tempted to draw attention away from the fact that this decision
is noteworthy. While this case did not change the legal analysis
set forth under Morales and Wolens, it did reaffirm the breadth of
the ADA preemption provision. The extension to the common
law and the newfound united front of the opinion are critical
expansions of the authority of the ADA preemption provision
and a tremendous setback to the autonomy of the states. This
expansion is critical because ADA preemption has broad sweep-
ing effects on the airline industry as a whole and will therefore
affect the future of aviation law.
55 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1431.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1433; see also 49 U.S.C. § 417 12(a) (2012)..
58 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232.
59 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1433.
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